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Abstract.     The Money Pump argument is designed to demonstrate the irrational flaw of having 
cyclic preferences, by showing how the irrational agent is vulnerable to exploitation. The 
argument faces some longstanding objections, which point out how one may avoid the threat of 
exploitation without resolving the associated irrationality. Recently a new, synchronic version of 
Money Pump has been put forward which promises to undercut those standard objections. 
However, I argue that the synchronic Money Pump cannot deliver on its promise: parallel 
objections can be reconstructed for this version, too, demonstrating that it ultimately does not 
improve on the original.  
 
 
Why have acyclic preferences? A common reply invokes the threat of being turned into a money 
pump. If one prefers a over b, b over c, but c over a, one may be manipulated into paying for a 
series of trades, only to be left with one’s initial object of choice. This influential argument for 
acyclicity of preferences appeared first in Davidson, McKinsey, and Suppes (1955). In their 
example, Mr. S. has the following cyclic set of preferences. Faced with choices between the 
positions of full professor with a salary of $5,000 (a); associate professor with a salary of $5,500 
(b); and assistant professor at $6,000 (c), Mr. S. prefers a over b, b over c, and c over a. The cyclic 
set renders Mr. S. vulnerable to manipulation: 
The department head, advised of Mr. S's preferences, says, 'I see you prefer b to c, so I 
will let you have the associate professorship – for a small consideration. The difference 
must be worth something to you.' Mr. S. agrees to slip the department head $25 to get 
the preferred alternative. Now the department head says, 'Since you prefer a to b, I'm 
prepared – if you will pay me a little for my trouble – to let you have the full 
professorship.' Mr. S. hands over another $25 and starts to walk away, well satisfied, we 
may suppose. 'Hold on,' says the department head, 'I just realized you'd rather have c 
than a. And I can arrange that – provided . . .' 
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A common reaction to the Money Pump argument raises the possibility of devising ways to 
circumvent the threat of exploitation. For example, having traded c for b and then b for a, Mr. S. 
may ‘get the drift’ and refuse any further transactions with the greedy department head (Schick 
1986); or alternatively, he may resolve in advance to avoid any trades that will result in his being 
exploited (McClennen 1990: 13).  
Recently, a new version of Money Pump has surfaced, which promises to improve on the 
original when it comes to overcoming these standard objections. Thus Johan Gustafsson (2013) 
dismisses the above objections as ‘irrelevant’; their seeming force comes from targeting a 
conspicuous but dispensable feature of the argument, while leaving its important core untouched. 
The threat of being fleeced for money is a mere dramatic device which serves to illustrate the 
deeper lesson of Money Pump about the irrationality of cyclic preferences. Remove the money 
pumper from the scene and you remove a vivid dramatic illustration of why cyclic preferences 
are rationally flawed; but you have not upset the thrust of the argument. Gustafsson 
demonstrates this point by formulating a synchronic analogue of the diachronic Money Pump. 
His synchronic version dispenses with the threat of exploitation, and hence undercuts the 
standard objections. Instead of the sequence of pairwise choices that figure in the original 
diachronic argument, Mr. S. is imagined to face just a single choice from the complete three-term 
set {a, b, c}. With no trades offered to swap one object for another, Mr. S. is not vulnerable to 
manipulation by the department head, and consequently has no use for precautionary measures 
of the kind suggested by Schick and McClennen. But his irrationality remains manifest. His cyclic 
preferences render him unable to make a choice with which he will be satisfied; whatever he 
chooses, there will be some alternative that he prefers to it.  
The synchronic version of Money Pump demonstrates the dialectical dispensability of the 
threat of exploitation. The irrationality of Mr. S. consists in a defective structure of preferences 
that cannot perform its role of effecting a stable choice; it is because of this irrational defect that 
Mr. S. is vulnerable to exploitation in the original Money Pump: no matter which option he 
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manages to secure, he would always be willing to pay to have another one instead. His 
vulnerability is thus indicative, not constitutive, of the irrational defect: even in the absence of the 
opportunity to pay for trades, the impossibility of making a satisfactory choice from the three-
term set exposes the real problem with cyclic preferences. 
It is certainly correct that vulnerability to manipulation does not exhaust the irrationality 
which Money Pump is thought to demonstrate. A similar point has been noted in the literature 
on another prominent argument for rational coherence that likewise invokes the threat of 
exploitation – the Dutch Book argument for having credences that satisfy the axioms of 
probability, for fear that otherwise one would be disposed to accept a losing profile of bets. Here 
is David Lewis (1999: 404-5): 
Note also that the point of any Dutch book argument is not that it would be imprudent 
to run the risk that some sneaky Dutchman will come and drain your pockets. After all, 
there aren't so many sneaky Dutchmen around; and anyway, if ever you see one coming, 
you can refuse to do business with him. Rather, the point is that if you are vulnerable to 
a Dutch book, whether synchronic or diachronic, that means that you have two 
contradictory opinions about the expected value of the very same transaction. To hold 
contradictory opinions may or may not be risky, but it is in any case irrational. 
 
Lewis is concerned with Dutch books, but parallel observations can be made about money 
pumps. The passage records two possible responses to the argument: that it trades on 
circumstances (the presence of Dutch bookies/money pumpers) that are too exotic to ground a 
perfectly general reason for avoiding irrationality; and that, even when such circumstances are in 
place, the threat they pose is easily neutralized without resolving the associated irrationality – a 
point demonstrated by Schick and McClennen for Money Pump when they propose ways to 
circumvent exploitation. Now the synchronic version of Money Pump successfully defuses both 
kinds of objection as formulated to target the diachronic version of the argument; with this it may 
seem to reveal the underlying irrational flaw of cyclic preferences, similarly to how Lewis points 
 4 
to the deeper flaw underlying the vulnerability to Dutch Books. However, it is possible to 
recover isomorphic objections which target the synchronic Money Pump itself. 
To bring this possibility into view, notice first a seemingly innocuous yet crucial 
assumption made by the synchronic Money Pump. The imputation of inability to effect a stable 
choice only gains purchase if we assume that one’s pairwise preferences imply a corresponding 
pattern of preference over the three-term set {a, b, c}; otherwise, there are no grounds for ascribing 
any specific three-term preference pattern, and in particular not the allegedly unstable one. What 
warrants the assumption? Gustafsson himself comes close to noticing this gap in his argument 
when he discusses Arrow’s restriction of preference to pairwise choices (Arrow 1959). But his 
reply mishandles the challenge: 
This objection, however, assumes that we must know what would happen if Mr. S were 
faced with a choice from {a, b, c}. But we only need to know that he would choose 
something, and that part is easy – we can just stipulate that the situation is such that the 
agent is forced to choose an alternative. The point is that we do not need to know which 
of a, b, and c Mr. S would choose, since he would [choose an alternative to which 
another is preferred] whichever he chooses. 
 
The problem is not so easily removed, however. Stipulating that one must make a choice from 
the three-term set may be enough to ensure that one will choose one of the options; but it says 
nothing about what one prefers. Gustafsson suggests that we need not know which specific choice 
one will actually make, since for any such choice there will be some other one that is considered 
preferable. With this he has gone beyond a mere stipulation that some choice or other will be 
made; he is also claiming that any such choice is guaranteed to be sub-optimal. And the measure 
of sub-optimality is precisely one’s pairwise preferences. If Mr. S’s three-term preference were not 
determined by his pairwise preferences, he would not be condemned to choosing a sub-optimal 
alternative. 
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The point bears notice, as it clears ground for reconstructing versions of the original 
objections to Money Pump. Recall the two objections encapsulated in the passage from Lewis. 
They are: (a) that the presence of money pumpers is too remote a contingency to ground a 
general reason for acyclic preferences; and (b) that the contingency, even when it does occur, 
carries a threat that is easily defused without resolving the associated irrationality. Start with (b). 
The original version of the objection, as formulated by McClennen, Schick, and others, suggests 
that exercising minimal forethought can eliminate the threat of exploitation; if Mr. S. refused to 
do business with the department head or planned his transactions in advance, he could not be 
fleeced for money. Now the threat posed by the synchronic Money Pump is that of facing a 
choice from the three-term set {a, b, c} that is guaranteed to be sub-optimal. And this threat is 
likewise circumvented by some forward thinking. Mr. S. may execute a protocol for choosing 
from {a, b, c} that does not involve simply reading his choice off his pairwise preferences. For 
example, he may decide to settle on some option randomly; or he may take account of the 
different (wider) context of choice presented by {a, b, c}. 
If the procedure seems contrived, notice that many choice problems are in fact such that 
preference varies with context. And in those cases, one may have cyclic preferences and yet be 
perfectly able to execute a satisfactory choice from the three-term set. Take a case described by 
John Broome (1991, §5.4 & 1999). Given a choice between mountaineering in the Alps (M) and 
visiting Rome (R), Maurice prefers to visit Rome. Given a choice between visiting Rome and 
staying at home (H), Maurice prefers to stay at home. Finally, given a choice between staying 
home and going mountaineering, he prefers mountaineering. As stated, Maurice’s preferences are 
cyclic; he prefers R over M, M over H, but H over R. His rationale for these preferences is that 
staying at home when the alternative is going mountaineering will seem cowardly, and so he 
prefers mountaineering. But when the alternative to mountaineering is visiting Rome, choosing 
Rome would seem cultured rather than cowardly, so he prefers Rome (Broome 1991, §5.4 & 
1999). 
Faced with a choice between {M, R, H}, Maurice does not suffer the inescapable 
dissatisfaction imputed to him by synchronic Money Pump. For example, he may happily choose 
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R, reasoning that visiting Rome would not seem cowardly but cultured. Scenarios like Maurice’s, 
where choice varies with context, are ubiquitous. And this reconstructs an isomorphic objection 
to (a) above: just like its diachronic counterpart, the synchronic Money Pump also trades on rare 
circumstances.  
The above point may be put differently by noting that the synchronic Money Pump relies 
on the dubious Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), sometimes invoked by decision 
theorists, whereby if there's any choice situation in which one chooses a rather than b, then in no 
choice situation may one choose b when a is also available.1 Of course, if the preference relation 
is understood as consisting in (or at least entailing) WARP, then the synchronic Money Pump goes 
through: as stated, Maurice’s preferences obviously violate WARP. But the present point is 
precisely that the possibility of agents like Maurice brings out the implausibility of understanding 
preference in that way.2 
The reconstruction of the original objections to Money Pump may seem to fail, as context 
cuts in already at the pairwise stage, rendering the charge of cyclic preferences spurious. Writing 𝐻! for ‘staying at home when the alternative is going to Rome’, and 𝐻! for ‘staying at home 
when the alternative is going mountaineering’, Maurice’s pairwise preferences should be 
understood as R over M, M over 𝐻!, and 𝐻! over R. Individuated finely in this way, no 
alternative involving staying at home appears twice, and Maurice cannot be understood as having 
cyclic preferences. He is thus no longer a target of Money Pump.3  
However, as Broome points out (1991: 100-7 & 1999: 73-5), the strategy of contextually 
refining the alternatives cannot plausibly be applied across the board. If every case of apparent 
cyclicity can be explained away by refining the individuation of alternatives, acyclicity becomes a 
constraint that cannot be violated, hence empty. There must therefore be cases where the identity 
of the unchosen alternative cannot rationally factor into one’s preference. For some A, B, and C, 
                                                      
1 See for example Sen (1971) and (1993). In fact, the strictly weaker assumption, known variously in the 
literature as Sen’s Property α, Chernoff’s Condition, and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, would 
seem to suffice for the purposes of the synchronic Money Pump.  
2 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for getting me to address this issue. 
3 For a related discussion of preference redescription in the context of Sen’s α, see (Neumann 2007). 
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that is, it must be the case that, unlike Maurice, one treats 𝐶! and 𝐶!   as equivalent, if acyclicity is 
to have any bite.4  
Take an exemplar of this sort, then. One prefers A over B, B over 𝐶! ,  and 𝐶!  over A. 
Suppose the only difference one can detect between 𝐶! and 𝐶!   is the following ‘Cambridge 
difference’: to choose the former is to choose C-rather-than-A, whereas to choose the latter is to 
choose C-rather-than-B. One is then presumably required to treat both alternatives as equivalent. 
Given that one prefers 𝐶!  over A, and A over B, acyclicity requires that one prefer 𝐶!  over B. 
acyclicity also requires, given that one treats 𝐶! and 𝐶! as equivalent, that one prefer 𝐶! over B. 
But one actually prefers B over 𝐶! . One is hence violating acyclicity, and is a target of Money 
Pump, unlike perhaps Maurice. 
Now does one face inescapable dissatisfaction given a choice from {A, B, C}, as 
synchronic Money Pump predicts? There are no grounds for supposing that one does. The way 
context informs one’s pairwise preferences need not constrain one’s three-term preference. Thus 
while one is required to treat 𝐶! as equivalent to 𝐶! , one may regard 𝐶!,! differently. And so one 
can happily choose A, for example, reasoning that although one prefers 𝐶!  to A, one does not 
have a preference for 𝐶!,!   over A and B.  
With this, parallel objections to the original Money Pump have been recovered for the 
synchronic version. It is often the case that one’s pattern of pairwise preferences fails to imply a 
corresponding three-term preference – for example, when context influences choice; hence the 
threat that cyclic preferences condemn one to sub-optimal choice arises only rarely. And even 
when the threat does arise, it can be defused by taking care to choose in some way other than 
being guided by one’s pairwise preferences, while remaining irrational. The synchronic Money 
Pump strips away the dramatic device of exploitation to reveal the core defect allegedly 
                                                      
4As Broome notes, a different possible solution to the problem of emptiness would be to require rational 
indifference between 𝐶! and 𝐶!. This alternative solution is set aside here, as Broome himself also does, so as 
to avoid complication and retain continuity with others who have discussed the problem (e.g. Tversky 
1975: 170-3). 
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demonstrated by the original diachronic version; but the standard objections to the latter can 
likewise be stripped of the drama to target that core directly. 
If the parallel between the reformulated objections and those made originally by Schick and 
McClennen seems loose, notice that the main criticism of the synchronic Money Pump is 
unaffected. The possibility of executing a satisfactory choice from a three-term set while 
remaining in violation of acyclicity draws out the failure of synchronic MP to demonstrate any 
rational defect with cyclic preferences. The synchornic version of the argument thus does not 
improve on the original: a failure of extensional adequacy vitiates Money Pump, in both its 
diachronic and synchronic forms. 
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